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I. INTRODUCTION
In response to the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001, the United
States Government has passed many new laws and regulations to strengthen
national security in an effort to better prepare for a new era in which
terrorists acting on American soil have become a constant threat.' On
October 30, 2001, the United States Attorney General, John Ashcroft,
The Author is a J.D. candidate for May 2004 at Nova Southeastern University,
Shepard Broad Law Center. The Author extends a thank you to his articles editor, Jennifer
Drown, and the Nova Law Review Junior Staff members.
1. E.g., USA Patriot Act, H.R. 3162. 107th Cong. (2001); 31 C.F.R. Part 103
(2002).
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authorized a Justice Department rule that permits the Director of the Bureau
of Prisons and other components of the Justice Department to monitor
traditional confidential communications between specified federal inmates
and their attorneys when senior intelligence and law enforcement officials
determine that the information could endanger national security or could
lead to other acts of violence and terrorism.2
On April 11, 2002, Lynne Stewart, a criminal defense attorney, was
arrested for providing material support and resources to a terrorist
organization. The Government's case developed from an investigation,
which included the monitoring of her communications with her client,
convicted terrorist Sheik Omar Abdel Rahman.3 The Sheik, as he is
commonly known, was convicted in 1995 of the World Trade Center
bombing in 1993 and for conspiring to blow up other New York City
landmarks. It is likely nobody would argue that The Sheik presents an
obvious security threat to the United States, therefore, it may appear that the
monitoring of his conversations with his lawyer were reasonable to prevent
future acts of terrorism. But, what are the implications of this rule on other
people in federal custody, others that may not appear as such obvious
threats? Does this new regulation unnecessarily abridge the rights of these
people to have confidential communications with their attorney in order to
be effectively represented?
The attorney-client privilege under federal law "is the oldest of the
privileges for confidential communications known to the common law. ' 4 It
is very likely that the constitutionality of this rule will be challenged in the
near future. As a result, this article will explore the constitutional arguments
that could be raised to challenge this regulation, and will examine the legal
context through the existing line of cases that have already placed limitations
on the attorney-client privilege. This article will begin by first examining
the federal regulations prior to September 11 th that permitted the Bureau of
Prisons to place special administrative measures on inmates in federal
custody in order to prevent future acts of violence or terrorism. Second, it
will look at the new federal regulation that was implemented by the Attorney
General after September 1 1th that permits the government to monitor the
communications between inmates and their attorneys under special
administrative measures. Third, this article will examine how the procedures
2. 28 C.F.R. §§ 500-01 (2001).
3. United States v. Stewart, No. 02 CR. 396 JGK, 2002 WL 1300059, at *2
(S.D.N.Y. June 11, 2002).
4. Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 389 (1981) (citing 8 J. WIGMORE,
EVIDENCE § 2290 (McNaughton rev. 1961)).
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of the federal regulation attempt to preserve the attorney-client privilege.
Fourth, it will examine the limited scope of protection the attorney-client
privilege receives under the Fourth and Sixth Amendments of the United
States Constitution. Fifth, this article will look into the crime-fraud
exception, under which communications between a client and an attorney are
not privileged if they are used to further an act of fraud or a crime. Sixth,
since this regulation affects inmates in federal custody, it will examine how
inmate rights are weighed against the governmental interest in maintaining
security at prisons through a limitation of constitutional rights and federal
wiretapping regulations. Seventh, this article will examine whether such an
intrusion into the attorney-client privilege will cause irreparable harm to
effective legal representation. Finally, this article will conclude that this
new federal regulation is a reasonable response to a real security threat, and,
if fairly applied, will adequately protect the rights of the inmate while
serving the legitimate governmental interest of preventing potential acts of
violence and terrorism.
II. NEW FEDERAL RULE
A. Regulations Prior to September 11, 2001
The threat imposed by terrorist acts on American soil was a prime
concern for the government even before September 11, 2001. One response
to the growing awareness of these potential attacks was from the Bureau of
Prisons. On June 20, 1997, the Bureau had finalized its interim regulations
of inmates in federal custody in order to maintain security at prison facilities
and to prevent future acts of violence and terrorism.5 Terrorism is defined in
the Code of Federal Regulations as any acts dangerous to human life that
violates the criminal laws of the United States and intends to intimidate or
coerce a civilian population or conduct and policy of a government. 6 These
rules were instituted to manage inmates who could possibly disclose
information that could harm national security or could lead to acts of
violence or terrorism.7 These regulations give the Director of the Bureau of
Prisons, upon direction of the Attorney General, authorization to implement
the special administrative measures.8 The Bureau of Prisons has complete
5. Prevention of Acts of Violence and Terrorism, 62 Fed. Reg. 33,7301, 33,732
(June 20,1997) (to be codified at 28 C.F.R. § 501.2).
6. 18 U.S.C. § 2331 (2002).
7. Prevention of Acts of Violence and Terrorism, 28 C.F.R. § 501.2-.3 (2002).
8. § 501.3(a).
20031
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discretionary power to determine what restrictions are implemented and
whom they are placed upon.9
Under the special administrative measures, an inmate can be housed in
segregated administrative detention as well as have certain other privileges
limited, including the use of a telephone, correspondence, visitation, and
interviews with the media.' 0 These restrictive measures reduce the risk that
an inmate, who has been shown to be a serious security risk, is able to cause
or facilitate a future act of violence or terrorism through their communica-
tions or contact with persons outside the prison. 1 For example, if a
suspected terrorist were arrested before they were able to carry out an attack,
the Bureau of Prisons would want to prevent the chance that they could
communicate with other members involved in the conspiracy or to pass
along the location of money or explosives that could be used to plan another
terrorist attack. This is not as far fetched as it might sound. Ramzi Yousef
was convicted for his participation in the World Trade Center bombing in
1993 and for conspiracy to blow up American-owned airplanes.12 Because
of Mr. Yousef's terrorist activities, the then Attorney General, Janet Reno,
authorized the Bureau of Prisons to place Mr. Yousef under special
administrative measures.'-
Before these restrictive measures are imposed, an inmate is given
written notification of the restrictions and reasons for its imposition. The
reasons why they have been imposed, however, may be limited for security
reasons or to prevent violence or terrorism. 15 These restrictive measures
may be imposed for up to 120 days or for up to one year with approval of the
Attorney General. 16 The Director of the Bureau of Prisons can also renew
the restrictions for up to one-year increments upon the written notification
by the Attorney General.'7 These measures cannot be renewed automati-
18 1cally. A fresh risk assessment must be done at the end of every period.' 9
9. Yousef v. Reno, 254 F.3d 1214, 1220-21 (10th Cir. 2001).
10. § 501.3(a).
11. Id.
12. Yousef, 254 F.3d at 1216.
13. Id.
14. 28 C.F.R. § 501.3(b).
15. Id.
16. § 501.3(c).
17. Id.
18. Yousef, 254 F.3d at 1219 (citing United States v. Johnson, 223 F.3d 665, 672 (7th
Cir. 2000)).
19. Id.
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B. New Regulation Post September 11, 2001
In response to the growing fear of additional terrorist attacks after
September 11 th, Attorney General John Ashcroft instituted a new restriction
on inmates already under special administrative measures to include the
monitoring of attorney-client communications. 20 This new restriction closed
a loophole that allowed an inmate to communicate freely with his attorney.
Before the Bureau of Prisons is allowed to monitor attorney-client
communications under this new regulation, the Attorney General must first
receive information from the head of a federal law enforcement or
intelligence agency that "reasonable suspicion exists to believe that a
particular inmate may use communications with attorneys or their agents to
further or facilitate acts of terrorism. ' 21 Upon such a finding, the Attorney
General may then instruct the Director of the Bureau of Prisons to begin the
appropriate procedures for the monitoring or review of the communications
22between the inmates and their attorneys. Such procedures include a written
notification to both the inmate and the inmate's attorney prior to the start of
the monitoring or review. 23 This written notification, however, need not be
24given where a court order directing that no notice be made is obtained.
C. Preservation of the Attorney-Client Privilege Under This Regulation
Although all communications between an inmate and his or her attorney
25are subject to monitoring and review under this new regulation, the
communications are still, for the most part, covered by the attorney-client
privilege. 26 The only communications that lose the attorney-client protection
are those that could "facilitate criminal acts or a conspiracy to commit
criminal acts," or are not related to legal advice or strategy. 27 The latter
category is, of course, communication that does not fall within the definition
28of attorney-client privilege under any evidentiary rule or state statute. The
20. 66 Fed. Reg. 55,065 (Oct. 31, 2001).
21. Prevention of Acts of Violence and Terrorism, 28 C.F.R. § 501.3(d) (2001).
22. Id.
23. § 501.3(d).
24. § 501.3(2).
25. § 501.3(i).
26. See 28 C.F.R. § 501.3(ii).
27. Id.
28. FED. R. EvID. 501.
Except as otherwise required by the Constitution of the United States or provided by
Act of Congress or in rules prescribed by the Supreme Court pursuant to statutory
2003] 479
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former category is also a well-recognized exception to the attorney-client
privilege, which provides that an attorney cannot assist his client in
29committing a crime.
Given that any conversation being monitored can contain both
privileged and non-privileged information, the regulation sets forth
procedures for the review of this information to determine whether it is
privileged and confidential, or whether it should be disclosed to the
investigating body.3  These procedures include the establishment of a
"privilege team," which consists of independent individuals that are not
involved in the investigation.3  This team follows monitoring procedures
that minimize the intrusion of the team into the privileged communications
32between the inmate and the attorney. The regulation, however, is not
exactly specific as to what these procedures are, but it does state that the
team does not retain any communications that are found to be privileged.
Once the team makes a decision that this information is not protected and
should be disclosed, it still must obtain a court order to release the
information: The team leader, however, can make a unilateral decision to
disclose the information to the investigating body, prior to receiving a court
order when the privilege team leader determines that potential act of
violence or terrorism is imminent.35
An inmate who feels the restrictions are too severe or unwarranted does
have legal recourse. Section 501.3 provides that affected inmates have a
right to seek a review of the restrictions that have been imposed through the
Administrative Remedy Program. 36 In Yousef v. Reno,37 the plaintiff-inmate
challenged the special administrative measures that were imposed on him
after his conviction, arguing that the measures imposed violated his rights
authority, the privilege of a witness, person, government, State, or political subdivision
thereof shall be governed by the principles of the common law as they may be inter-
preted by the courts of the United States in the light of reason and experience.
Id.
29. Clark v. United States, 289 U.S. 1, 16 (1933) (holding the communication
intended to further an act of fraud or crime is not protected by the attorney-client privilege).
30. 28 C.F.R. § 501.3(3).
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. 28 C.F.R. § 501.3(d)(3).
36. Prevention of Acts of Violence and Terrorism, 28 C.F.R. § 501.3(e) (2001).
37. 254 F.3d 1214 (10th Cir. 2001).
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38
under the First, Sixth, and Eighth Amendments. The Tenth Circuit Court
of Appeals, however, dismissed Mr. Yousef's claims because he failed to
exhaust all his administrative remedies. 39 Thus, the court seemed to leave
the door open to these claims once all remedies were exhausted.
I. THE LIMITED SCOPE OF THE ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE
A. Sixth Amendment Protection of the Attorney-Client Privilege
Despite the long history behind the attorney-client privilege, no such
explicit privilege exists in the United States Constitution. The Sixth
Amendment does, however, afford an individual the right to counsel in all
criminal prosecutions.4 0 The issue that often arises is whether an intrusion
into the attorney-client privilege damages the effectiveness of an attorney's
representation of his client and thus violates the Sixth Amendment. 41 An
42example of this is discussed in Massiah v. United States. In that case,
Massiah, a merchant seaman, was arrested for smuggling cocaine into the
United States aboard a ship he was working on.43 While he was out on bail,
a federal agent, who was investigating the case, succeeded in getting another
man involved in the smuggling operation to cooperate with the government
by helping to gather more information on Massiah. 44 So, without Massiah's
knowledge, a listening device was placed in the informant's car and a few
days later a lengthy conversation was recorded between Massiah and the
informant.45 This recording included several incriminating statements that
Massiah made which were later used at his trial, and ultimately led to his
38. Yousef v. Reno, 254 F.3d 1214, 1216-17 (10th Cir. 2001).
39. Id. at 1222.
40. U.S. CONST. amend. VI. This amendment states that:
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public
trial, by and impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime shall have been
committed, which district shall have been previously ascertained by law, and to be
informed of the nature and cause of the accusation; to be confronted with the witnesses
against him; to have compulsory process for obtaining Witness in his favor, and to
have the Assistance of Counsel for his defense.
U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
41. See, e.g., Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S. 201 (1964).
42. 377 U.S. 201 (1964).
43. Id.
44. Id. at 202.
45. Id. at 202-03.
2003]
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conviction.46 On appeal, Massiah argued that his Sixth Amendment rights
were violated because the government agents sought to gain incriminating
evidence against him after he was indicted and without the presence of his
attorney. 47 The Court held that the incriminating evidence gained without
48the presence of his lawyer violated his Sixth Amendment right to counsel.
Further, the Court noted:
[A] Constitution which guarantees a defendant the aid of counsel at
such a trial could surely vouchsafe no less to an indicted defendant
under interrogation by the police in a completely extrajudicial pro-
ceeding. Anything less, it was said, might deny a defendant "effec-
tive representation by counsel at the only stage when legal aid and
advice would help him.",
49
In Massiah, the prosecution's use of the incriminating evidence led to the
defendant's conviction and thus clearly caused injury to the defendant. But
what happens when a violation of a defendant's Sixth Amendment rights
does not injure or prejudice the defendant?
A further example of the damage or injury needed is illustrated by the
case of Weatherford v. Bursey.5° In that case, the plaintiff, along with the
defendant, who was an undercover agent, were arrested for a state criminal
offense.5' The defendant went through the charade of the arrest in order to
52maintain his undercover status. Although the defendant retained his own
counsel, he attended two pretrial meetings with the plaintiff and his
attorney.53 The plaintiff's attorney requested the defendant's presence in
order to obtain additional information or advice for the trial.54 At no time
did the defendant discuss the content of the meetings with his superiors or
with the prosecution team.55 After the defendant had been seen in the
company of police officers, which compromised his cover, he was called as a
46. Id.
47. Massiah, 377 U.S at 204.
48. Id. at 207.
49. Id. at 204 (citing Spano v. New York, 360 U.S. 315, 326 (1959) (Douglas, J.,
concurring)).
50. 429 U.S. 545 (1977).
51. Id. at 547.
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. Id. at 548.
55. Weatherford, 429 U.S. at 548.
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56witness for the prosecution. After the plaintiff's conviction, he brought
suit against the defendant claiming the defendant's participation in the two
pretrial meetings compromised the effectiveness of his counsel and thus
violated his rights under the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments.57  The
district court found in favor of the defendant, but the Fourth Circuit Court of
Appeals reversed, holding that "'whenever the prosecution knowingly
arranges or permits intrusion into the attorney-client relationship, the right to
counsel is sufficiently endangered to require reversal and a new trial.
' ' 5
The United States Supreme Court, however, disagreed with the Fourth
Circuit Court of Appeals, holding that this per se rule was incorrect.59 In
reaching its decision, the Court distinguished three of its earlier opinions
relied upon by the Fourth Circuit. 60 Specifically, those decisions were the
Supreme Court's opinions in Black v. United States,6' O'Brien v. United
States,62 and Hoffa v. United States.61
In Black, the defendant was charged with evading federal income
taxes. 64 In a matter unrelated to his tax situation, the Federal Bureau of
Investigation ("FBI") placed a listening device in Black's hotel suite in
Washington D.C.65 Over a three-month period, the FBI recorded conversa-
tions that included conversations Black had with his attorney concerning the
66federal income tax charges. The FBI stated that they destroyed the
recorded tapes but that notes were kept which summarized and quoted these
67conversations. When the government attorneys prosecuting the tax case
began trial preparation, they received information and transcripts from the
FBI, including the summaries of the conversations Black had with his
68attorney. It was not until after the trial began that the government attorney
realized that the information from the FBI included conversations between
Black and his attorney. 69 The Solicitor General argued that since the tax
56. Id. at 549.
57. Id.
58. Id. (quoting Weatherford v. Bursey, 528 F.2d 483, 486 (4th Cir. 1975)).
59. Id. at 551.
60. Weatherford v. Bursey, 429 U.S. 545, 550-53 (1977).
61. 385 U.S. 26 (1966).
62. 386 U.S. 345 (1967).
63. 385 U.S. 293 (1966).
64. See Black, 385 U.S. at 27-29.
65. Id. at 27.
66. Id.
67. Id. at 27-28.
68. Id. at 28.
69. Black, 385 U.S. at 28.
2003]
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division attorneys did not find anything relevant in the transcripts from the
FBI, a new trial should not be granted, rather the judgment should be vacated
to the district court to determine if the materials were irrelevant and the
conviction should stand. 70 The Supreme Court did not agree and it held that
"[i]n view of these facts it appears that justice requires that a new trial be
held so as to afford the petitioner an opportunity to protect himself from the
use of evidence that might be otherwise inadmissible."
7
'
The other case the Fourth Circuit relied upon in its decision was
O'Brien v. United States.72 In this case, which is very similar to Black,
Charles O'Brien was convicted on several counts of stealing merchandise
from a United States Customs Service facility.73 The FBI placed a listening
device in a commercial establishment owned by O'Brien's friend.74 During
the surveillance, the FBI recorded conversations O'Brien had with his
attorney concerning his upcoming trial over the theft from the customs
service facility.75 The conversations between O'Brien and his attorney were
then summarized in the FBI's logs, but were never mentioned in any report
and were in no way communicated to the attorneys for the Department of
76Justice, which was prosecuting O'Brien's case. In a per curiam decision,
the United States Supreme Court vacated the judgment and remanded it back
to the district court for a new trial if the government desired to retry the
case.77 In his dissent, Justice Harlan argued that the order to vacate for a
78
new trial was premature. Justice Harlan agreed that O'Brien was entitled
to a hearing to determine how much, if any, of the recorded material was
possibly used at trial,79 but stated that "'a new trial is not an appropriate
vehicle for sorting out the eavesdropping issue because, until it is determined
that such occurrence vitiated the original conviction, no basis for a retrial
exists. The Court's action puts the cart before the horse."
80
The decision in Hoffa was more in line with Justice Harlan's view. In
that case, a government informant sat in on Hoffa's conversations with his
70. Id.
71. Id. at 28-29.
72. 386 U.S. at 345.
73. Id.
74. Id. at 346.
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. O'Brien, 386 U.S. at 345.
78. Id. at 346-47 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
79. Id. at 346 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
80. Id. at 347 (Harlan, J., dissenting) (quoting Black, 385 U.S. at 31 (Harlan, J.,
dissenting)).
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lawyers and other people during his trial of a Taft-Hartly Act violation.8'
Although that trial ended in a hung jury, there were allegations of jury
tampering on the part of Mr. Hoffa and new charges were brought against
82him. At the second trial, the government informant testified to conversa-
tions that he had overheard between Hoffa and other third parties, but this
did not include any conversations that Hoffa had with his lawyers.83 Hoffa
was convicted of jury tampering and he subsequently challenged his
conviction on the grounds that the government informant violated his Sixth
84Amendment right to counsel. The Supreme Court held that Hoffa's Sixth
Amendment right was not violated, however, because the testimony by the
85informant did not deal with conversations that Hoffa had with his lawyers.
Yet, the Court noted that, had Hoffa been convicted in his first case, it would
have been reversed because the informant had listened to conversations
between Hoffa and his lawyers and reported at least some of this information
back to the authorities.86
To distinguish these cases, the Supreme Court's opinion in Weatherford
notes that the only inference that can be made from Black, O'Brien, and
Hoffa, is that when conversations between clients and their attorneys are
overheard, a Sixth Amendment violation depends upon whether the
87communications led to evidence, either direct or indirect, at trial. The
Court also held that a Sixth Amendment violation might occur if the
privileged conversations between a client and his or her counsel, was the
subject of testimony at trial, was the origination of evidence used later at
trial, or was "used in any other way to the substantial detriment of the
client., 88 Therefore, as long as information obtained from the meetings is
not communicated, there is no substantial threat to a defendant's Sixth
89Amendment rights.
81. Weatherford, 429 U.S. at 552-53 (citing Hoffa v. United States, 385 U.S. 293
(1966)).
82. Id. at 553 (citing Hoffa v. United States, 385 U.S. 293, 294 (1966)).
83. Id. (citing Hoffa v. United States, 385 U.S. 293, 307-08 (1966)).
84. Id. (citing Hoffa v. United States, 385 U.S. 293, 295 (1966)).
85. Id. at 553-54 (citing Hoffa v. United States, 385 U.S. 293, 307-08 (1966)).
86. Weatherford, 429 U.S. at 553 (citing Hoffa v. United States, 385 U.S. 293
(1966)).
87. Id. at 552.
88. Id. at 554.
89. Id. at 558.
2003]
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Thus, in order to prove a Sixth Amendment violation, there must be at
least a showing of prejudice to the defendant or a benefit to the State. 90 A
two-part test is used to determine if there is sufficient prejudice.
[A] prejudice analysis is employed at two levels in the Sixth
Amendment context. First, some amount of prejudice is required
in order to establish the existence of a Sixth Amendment violation,
but the prejudice need not be "outcome determinative." Second,
once a violation is established the level of prejudice will determine
the remedy, if any, which is required.9'
A court will not dismiss an indictment as a sanction for government
intrusion into the attorney-client relationship unless the required amount of
prejudice to the defendant is shown.92
In order for an inmate to show that his Sixth Amendment right to
counsel is violated under section 501.3 of the United States Code, some
amount of prejudice will have to be established. The only way that this
could happen is if the privilege team, who is monitoring the communications
between the inmate and his attorney, saves the recording or creates a
summary of the conversations, and provides it to the prosecution team if the
inmate has not already been convicted. The prosecution team would also
have to use this information in the trial in order to get the heaviest sanction
of having the indictment dismissed.
B. Fourth Amendment Protection of the Attorney-Client Protection
Section 501.3 provides procedures whereby the prosecution, if
applicable, is walled off from the "privilege team" that monitors potentially
privileged attorney-client communications to prevent its disclosure.93 These
procedures prevent a Sixth Amendment violation from occurring, but an
individual's Fourth Amendment rights might be still be violated.94 Because
90. United States v. Noriega, 764 F. Supp. 1480, 1488 (S.D. Fla. 1991) (citing
Weatherford, 429 U.S. at 558)).
91. Id. at 1490 n.8 (quoting United States v. Kelly, 790 F.2d 130, 138 n.6 (D.C. Cir.
1986)).
92. Id. at 1489-90 (citing United States v. Morrison, 449 U.S. 361 (1981)).
93. Prevention of Acts of Violence and Terrorism, 28 C.F.R. § 501.3 (2001).
94. Akhil R. Amar & Vikram D. Amar, The New Regulations Allowing Federal
Agents to Monitor Attorney-Client Conversations: Why it Threatens Fourth Amendment
Values, Findlaw, (Nov. 16, 2001), at http://writ.news.findlaw.com/amar/20011116.htm. The
Fourth Amendment provides:
[Vol. 27:475
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the Sixth Amendment protects the attorney-client privilege only in the
context of a criminal prosecution, the Fourth Amendment may offer more
protection because its privacy protection is broader. 95 A Fourth Amendment
challenge to section 501.3 is likely because
[it] should be read to protect this entire range of communication.
To begin, surely an inmate in federal detention whose every
movement is tracked by the government has been "seized" with the
meaning of the Amendment; and eavesdropping on conversations
has long been held to be a Fourth-Amendment protected
"search. , 96
A Fourth Amendment challenge to monitored communications was
raised in United States v. Noriega. In that case, Manuel Noreiga, the
former dictator of Panama, was being held at the Metropolitan Correctional
Center ("MCC") in Miami awaiting trial on drug trafficking charges.98 The
security procedures at MCC provided that all calls made by inmates on its
phones were automatically and randomly monitored by a central recording
system.99 Under MCC's regulations, if an inmate wanted to make an
unmonitored call, a specific request had to be made to a guard and explicitly
request that the call be unmonitored or that he "wishe[d] to engage in a
'privileged' attorney-client communication."'0° The phone which Noriega
had access to also had a sticker on it which stated "that all calls made on that
phone, with the exception of 'properly placed' calls to an attorney, were
subject to monitoring and recording by the Bureau of Prisons. ' ' During a
period of nine months, "Noriega made over 1,400 telephone calls, including
some to his attorneys, from that phone."' 2  "The government served
[several] subpoenas [to] MCC for production of Noriega's tape-recorded
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects,
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall
issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly
describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.
U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
95. Amar & Amar, supra note 94.
96. Id.
97. 764 F. Supp. 1480, 1482 (S.D. Fla. 1991).
98. Id.
99. Id.
100. Id. at 1485.
101. Id. at 1483.
102. Noriega, 764 F. Supp. at 1483.
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conversations."'' 0 3 In order to shield itself from privileged attorney-client
conversations, the trial team had the calls screened by a Spanish-speaking
DEA agent to remove all privileged communications from the tapes that
would be turned over to the trial team.'4 Despite the screening process,
some of Noriega's privileged communications accidentally reached the trial
team through summaries of the tapes.105 Upon learning of this intrusion into
the attorney-client privilege, Noriega moved to have the charges against him
dropped on the grounds that it violated his rights under the Sixth and Fourth
Amendments. 1
06
Noriega's Sixth Amendment argument was dismissed by the district
court because he failed to show the prejudice or injury required to prove a
Sixth Amendment violation. 10 7 The court also rejected Noriega's Fourth
Amendment claim holding that this Amendment "protects only those
subjects or areas in which there is a legitimate expectation of privacy.' 0 8
There is also no expectation of privacy when information is passed
voluntarily to third parties.' ° The court held that there was no evidence to
suggest that Noriega had an expectation of privacy when he made the
calls." 0 Noriega was given adequate notice that his calls were subject to
being monitored and he had no subjective expectation of privacy because he
often warned the people to whom he was talking to be careful about what
they discussed as well as using cryptic language during the conversations. '''
Thus, a Fourth Amendment violation will not be found when there is no
expectation of privacy. Since section 501.3 is applicable to inmates who are
given notice that they are under special administrative measures and that
their conversations with their attorneys may be monitored, there is no
realistic expectation of privacy for these inmates. Therefore, it is likely that
an inmate's Fourth Amendment challenge to section 501.3 would fail if its
provisions are carried out properly.
103. Id.
104. Id.
105. Id. at 1484.
106. Id.
107. Noriega, 764 F. Supp. at 1488.
108. Id. at 1492 (citing Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 743-44 (1979)).
109. Id.
110. Id.
111. Id.
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IV. CRIME-FRAUD EXCEPTION
One of the principle legal foundations of section 501.3's intrusion into
the attorney-client privilege is the crime-fraud exception. This rule exempts
communication used to further a future criminal act from the traditional
protections afforded by the attorney-client privilege. 2 One of the earliest
Supreme Court cases that discussed the limitations of privileged communica-
tions is Clark v. United States.1 13 In that case, a juror was convicted of
criminal contempt for knowingly giving false and misleading testimony
during voir dire in order to remain of the jury and thereby thwart the
prosecution of her former employer." 14  The petitioner challenged the
admissibility of the testimony of her conduct during jury deliberations
because the arguments and votes of jurors are privileged and cannot be
disclosed unless they are waived. 
15
In discussing the origin and policy reasons supporting the privilege, the
Court noted that the social policy behind the privilege might conflict with• • ,. • 116
other competing social policies. The free and independent debate of the
jury room may be chilled if the juror's comments and votes were made
publicly available.' 17 The Court noted that "the function of the court to
weigh these competing policies is more essential when there is little
guidance in either case law or treaties that precisely limit the privilege in
question.",118 The Court then held that this privilege is "not applicable when
the circumstances giving rise to the privilege were fraudulently begun or
continued."11 9 In support of its decision, the Court looked to analogies in
other privileges for precedent, specifically citing an early case that held that
the attorney-client privilege did not protect a client who consults with an
attorney in order to help him commit a fraud. 12  The Court noted that
although many early cases required only an unsubstantiated charge of
illegality to remove this privilege, 121 later rulings held that specific evidence
of illegality must be shown before such privilege is destroyed. 12 The Court
112. United States v. Zolin, 491 U.S. 554, 556 (1989).
113. Clark, 289 U.S. at 1.
114. Id. at 6-7.
115. Id. at 12.
116. Id. at 13.
117. Id.
118. Clark, 289 U.S. at 13.
119. Id. at 14.
120. Id. at 15.
121. Id. (citations omitted).
122. Id.
20031
15
Kearns: Attorney-Client Privilege for Suspected Terrorists: Impact of the
Published by NSUWorks, 2003
Nova Law Review
further stated that the confidences of a client and his or her attorney are
protected only until abuse has been adequately demonstrated to the
satisfaction of the judge. 123
In United States v. Gordon-Nikkar,124 the Fifth Circuit denied a
petitioner's appeal from a cocaine trafficking and possession conviction
because of the testimony of a government witness regarding two meetings
the petitioner had with her attorney. 25 At one of the meetings, which
included several other co-defendants including the government witness, the
petitioner and the other people present agreed to give false testimony to hide
their crime.126 The court held that it was not a confidential communication
because some of the participants at the meeting were not clients of the
attorney. 127 Yet, the court further opined that, even if it was considered
confidential, the testimony of the government witness was admissible
because the attorney-client privilege does not include communications
regarding the intent to commit a crime. 128 "The policy underlying the
attorney-client privilege is to promote the administration of justice. It would
be a perversion of the privilege to extend it so as to protect communication
designed to frustrate justice by committing other crimes to conceal past
misdeeds."
' 129
The rules and procedures that a court uses in determining whether the
crime-fraud exception is applicable in a given situation, greatly impact the
strength of the attorney-client privilege. The issues facing the application of
the crime-fraud exception were examined in the United States Supreme
Court's opinion in United States v. Zolin.130 In that case, the Internal
Revenue Service ("IRS") issued a summons that demanded the production of
certain materials involving an investigation into the tax returns of L. Ron
Hubbard, the founder of the Church of Scientology. 13  These materials
included some tapes that the church claimed were protected by the attorney-
client privilege. 32 "The IRS filed a petition to enforce its summons with the
United States District Court for the Central District of California. 133 The IRS
123. Clark, 289 U.S. at 16.
124. 518 F.2d 972, 974 (5th Cir. 1975).
125. Id. at 974.
126. Id.
127. Id.
128. Id. at 975.
129. Gordon-Nikkar, 518 F.2d at 975.
130. Zolin, 491 U.S. at 556.
131. Id.
132. Id. at 557.
133. Id. at 558.
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argued that the tapes were not privileged communications as the respondents
claimed, but rather, fell within the crime-fraud exception.' 34 In support of
its request to have the court listen to the tapes, the IRS offered partial
transcripts of the tapes that it had lawfully obtained. 35 The district court
ruled that while the transcripts showed some evidence of past crimes, there
was nothing to indicate that future crimes were planned.
36
The respondents appealed to the Ninth Circuit on other grounds and the
IRS cross-appealed claiming, in part, that the district court incorrectly ruled
on the crime-fraud exception without listening to the tapes in camera. 37 The
Ninth Circuit held that in order for the crime-fraud exception to apply to
privileged communication, the party opposing the privilege must base its
assertion on "sources independent of the attorney-client communications
recorded on the tapes."' 38 The Ninth Circuit held that the IRS's "independ-
ent evidence" did not support a finding of the crime-fraud exception.139 This
case was then granted certiorari to the United States Supreme Court. 40
The Supreme Court stated that many questions can arise when a crime-
fraud exception claim is made. 14' The three principle questions raised in
Zolin were: 1) whether a district court can review privileged communica-
tions in order to determine if the crime-fraud exception applies; 2) what
minimum amount of evidence must be shown before a court can undertake a
review; and 3) if there is an evidentiary threshold requirement needed before
an opposing party claims a crime-fraud exception, whether the privileged
material itself can be used to satisfy it.142 The Court first looked at the
Federal Rules of Evidence to determine if it bars an in camera review of
privileged communications. 143  It noted that two rules, specifically Rule
104(a) and Rule 1101(c), of the Federal Rules of Evidence, stand out when
first examining these questions. 44 When taken together, these rules can be
134. Id.
135. Zolin, 491 U.S. at 558.
136. Id. at 559.
137. Id. at 560.
138. Id. at 561 (quoting United States v. Zolin, 809 F.2d 1411, 1418 (9th Cir. 1987),
overruled on other grounds by United States v. Jose, 131 F.3d 1325 (9th Cir. 1999)).
139. Zolin, 809 F.2d at 1418-19.
140. Zolin, 491 U.S. at 560.
141. Id. at 563.
142. Id. at 564-65.
143. Id. at 565.
144. Id. at 565-66. Rule 104(a) states:
Preliminary questions concerning the qualification of a person to be a witness, the
existence of a privilege, or the admissibility of evidence shall be determined by the
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read to conclude that a court cannot review the privileged communication to
determine the crime-fraud exception.145 But this interpretation leads to a
result that, once a court finds that the communication is privileged, it would
be almost impossible to ever prove a crime-fraud exemption. Thus, the
Court rejected this interpretation and stated that the plain language of Rule
104 does not explicitly exclude "all materials" from a court's consideration
of an exception. Therefore, the Court held that the district court in Zolin
was permitted to conduct an in camera review of the tapes.1
4 8
In its decision, the Supreme Court held that, while a blanket rule
allowing an in camera review in every circumstance would jeopardize the
policy reasons behind the attorney-client privilege, "the costs of imposing an
absolute bar to consideration of the communications in camera for purpose
of establishing the crime-fraud exception are intolerably high."'
149
[W]e conclude that evidence that is not "independent" of the con-
tents of allegedly privileged communications-like the partial tran-
scripts in this case-may be used not only in the pursuit of in cam-
era review, but also may provide the evidentiary basis for the ulti-
mate showing that the crime-fraud exception applies. We see little
to distinguish these two uses: in both circumstances, if the evi-
dence has not itself been determined to be privileged, its exclusion
does not serve the policies which underlie the attorney-client privi-
lege.15
0
The Court further held that since an in camera review of privileged
communication is a lesser intrusion on the attorney-client privilege than a
public disclosure, a lower evidentiary threshold is required than would be to
overcome the privilege itself.'' But, a party claiming a crime-fraud
exception "must present evidence sufficient to support a reasonable belief
court, subject to the provisions of subdivision (b). In making its determination it is not
bound by the rules of evidence except those with respect to privileges.
FED. R. EVID. 104(a). Rule 1101(c) states: "The rule with respect to privileges applies at all
stages of all actions, cases, and proceedings." Id.
145. Zolin, 491 U.S. at 566.
146. Id. at 567.
147. Id. at 566.
148. Id. at 568.
149. Id. at 569.
150. Zolin, 491 U.S. at 574 n.12.
151. Id. at 572 (quoting David J. Fried, Too High a Price for Truth: The Exception to
the Attorney-Client Privilege for Contemplated Crimes and Frauds, 64 N.C. L. REV. 443, 467
(1986)).
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that an in camera review may yield evidence that establishes the exception's
applicability. ' ' 1 This requirement may be met by using any lawfully
obtained evidence that the court has not adjudicated to be privileged. 153
If under section 501.3 the "privilege team" monitors conversations that
are used to further acts of terrorism, it is permitted to release it to the proper
authorities. 154 This is what occurred in the case of the Sheik when he was
using his conversations with his lawyer to direct the terrorist activities of his
followers. 155 This obviously falls within the crime-fraud exception and is
precisely the type of information section 501.3 was designed to prevent. 56
V. LIMITATIONS ON INMATE RIGHTS
A. Constitutional Limitations of Inmate Rights
Since section 501.3 is applicable to inmates under the supervision of the
Bureau of Prisons, as well as other people in federal custody, it is important
to examine how the rights of inmates are limited under existing law and how
the courts balance the constitutional rights of inmates and the government's
legitimate interest in protecting society. One of the leading cases in this area
is Pell v. Procunier.157 In that case, three professional journalists and four
inmates brought suit against various California Department of Corrections
officials, claiming that a corrections department rule, which prohibited face-
to-face media interviews with specific inmates, violated their rights of free
speech under the First and Fourteenth Amendments. This rule prohibited
media and press interviews with specific inmates, but still permitted
interviews with a random selection of inmates.1
59
The United States Supreme Court began its decision with the
proposition that "[1]awful incarceration brings about the necessary
withdrawal or limitations of many privileges and rights, a retraction justified
by the considerations underlying our penal system."' 160  "In the First
Amendment context a corollary of this principle is that a prison inmate
152. Id. at 574-75.
153. Id. at 575.
154. Prevention of Acts of Violence and Terrorism, 28 C.F.R. § 501.3 (2002).
155. Harriet Chiang, Colleagues Call Lawyer's Arrest Harmful, THE S.F. CHRONICLE,
April 11, 2002, at A3.
156. Prevention of Acts of Violence and Terrorism, 28 C.F.R. § 501.3(d)(2)(i) (2002).
157. 417 U.S. 817 (1973).
158. Id. at 819.
159. Id.
160. Id. at 822 (quoting Price v. Johnson, 334 U.S. 266, 285 (1948)).
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retains those First Amendment rights that are not inconsistent with his status
as a prisoner or with the legitimate penological objectives of the corrections
system."' 6 Thus, any constitutional challenges to prison regulations must be
weighed against the legitimate policies and goals of a correctional system,
which is principally to deter crime by separating convicted criminals from
society and hopefully to rehabilitate them for their return to society. 162
In its decision, the Court stated that the alternative means of communi-
cation available to the inmates should be a relevant factor when weighing the
inmates' First Amendment rights against any legitimate governmental
interests.163 Because the inmates in California still had other reasonable and
effective means of communication available to them and the regulations
were uniformly applied, the regulations did not violate the inmate's rights
under the First and Fourteenth Amendments.164 The Court further noted that
"[tihe nature of a place, the pattern of its normal activities, dictate the kinds
of regulations of time, place, and manner are reasonable." 65 In a prison
environment, in which security concerns are of great importance, the
restrictions of people allowed to enter the prison and interview inmates are
considered reasonable. 1
66
B. Inmate Exemptions from Federal Wiretapping Statutes
The governmental interest in maintaining security in prisons also
restricts an inmate's ability to make unmonitored phone calls while in
custody. Title Il of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act,
"forbids the willful interception of wire communications, including
telephone conversations, without prior judicial authorization."' 167 However,
this limitation of governmental power does not fully apply to inmates. There
are two exceptions to this statute that allow prison officials to tape the
conversations of inmates.168 Prison officials can intercept communications
through wiretaps if: 1) it falls within their routine duties; or 2) one of the
parties to the communication gives their consent to the interceptions. 169
161. Id.
162. Pell, 417 U.S at 822-23.
163. Id. at 824 (citing Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753, 765 (1972).
164. Id. at 826.
165. Id. (quoting Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 115 (1972) (internal
quotation marks omitted)).
166. Id. at 827.
167. United States v. Noriega, 764 F. Supp. 1480, 1490 (S.D. Fla. 1991).
168. Id.
169. 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510(5)(a)(ii), 2511(2)(c) (2002).
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The first exception, section 2510(5)(a)(ii), states that a law enforcement
officer, which includes prison officials, are permitted to use wiretaps to
intercept inmate calls when it is done "in the ordinary course of his
duties."' 70 In United States v. Sababu,171 the Seventh Circuit held that taping
of inmate phone calls is permitted when it is done according to prison
regulations and within the normal routine.1 72 The routine use of phone taps
is authorized by 28 C.F.R. section 540.100. This regulation states that
"[i]nmate telephone use is subject to limitations and restrictions which the
Warden determines are necessary to insure the security, good order, and
discipline of the institution and to protect the public. The Warden shall
establish procedures and facilities for inmate telephone use.' 73
The interception of communications is also authorized when "one of the
parties to the communication has given prior consent to such intercep-
tion. ' 74  A violation of this statute was raised in the prison context in
Noriega.'75 The district court rejected Noriega's claim because Noriega's
conversations were recorded under the normal routine of the prison and were
based on legitimate security concerns.176 Noriega's claim was also rejected
because his consent to be monitored could be inferred from the ample
warnings he received through the stickers on the phone, orientation manual,
and other consent forms.
177
How the courts interpret Title III may be useful in understanding how
the courts might view challenges to the intrusion into the attorney-client
privilege in section 501.3. First of all, before any inmate can be subject to
having his conversations between himself and his attorney monitored, they
must first be placed under "special administrative measures."'178 The inmates
are given written notification of the restrictions that will be imposed as well
as the reasons why they are having the restrictions placed on them. 79 If the
security risks are severe enough, the inmate may have the additional measure
of monitoring his or her attorney-client communications placed on him or
her by the Attorney General, once he is notified by law enforcement or
170. 18 U.S.C. § 2510 (2002).
171. 891 F.2d 1308 (7th Cir. 1989).
172. Sababu, 891 F.2d at 1329.
173. Id. at 1329 n.7 (quoting 28 C.F.R. § 540.100).
174. 18 U.S.C. § 2511(2)(c).
175. Noriega, 764 F. Supp. at 1490.
176. Id. at 1491.
177. Id.
178. Prevention of Acts of Violence and Terrorism, 28 C.F.R. § 501.3(a) (2002).
179. § 501.3(b).
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intelligence officials of the heightened security risk.' 8° The selected inmate
also receives an additional notice of this extra security measure, unless a
court gives its authorization not to provide the additional warning. '8
Since under most circumstances section 501.3 provides the inmate with
sufficient notice of the extra security measures that are being imposed, it
would be hard to establish that there is any expectation of privacy. The
rights enjoyed by regular inmates are initially limited by the fact that they
are in custody. The security concerns of maintaining a prison naturally
reduce the rights and privileges enjoyed by inmates. Add to this the security
concerns needed to apply "special administrative measures" and finally, the
highest level of a security threat needed to impose the monitoring of
attorney-client communications, and any expectation of privacy by the
inmate is minimal.
VI. IRREPARABLE HARM TO EFFECTIVE LEGAL REPRESENTATION?
The courts and the public at large have accepted the reduced rights and
privileges of inmates, but the issue of monitoring attorney-client communica-
tions has caused substantial unease among the legal community.' 82 Many
lawyers and civil rights activists are concerned that monitoring the
communications of people who qualify under section 501.3, including
suspected terrorists, will have a chilling effect on the lawyers who represent
them.183 But, is this an irreparable harm to effective legal representation?
There is no doubt that the knowledge that the government is taping the
communications between someone who is in federal custody and his or her
lawyer would cause them both to closely guard their words. The client
would be very apprehensive about giving details that might be potentially
incriminating to him. This would, in turn, hurt the ability of the attorney to
know as much as possible about the client's case and thus, limit the
effectiveness of the attorney's representation. In fact, the courts recognize
that the purpose of the attorney-client privilege is to "encourage clients to
make full disclosure to their attorneys.'
184
180. § 501.3(d).
181. § 501.3(d)(2).
182. Chiang, supra note 155.
183. Id.
184. Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 389 (1981) (quoting Fisher v United
States, 425 U.S. 391, 403 (1976)).
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[The attorney-client privilege's] purpose is to encourage full and
frank communication between attorneys and, their clients and
thereby promote broader public interests in the observance of law
and administration of justice. The privilege recognizes that sound
legal advice or advocacy serves public ends and that such sound
legal advice or advocacy depends on a lawyer being fully in-
formed. 185
There is no denying that this regulation will have a detrimental effect on the
inmate's legal representation, but it is not irreparable. The inmates that are
subject to having their conversations with their attorneys monitored are not
the typical inmates in federal custody. These inmates have been determined
by the Attorney General or by other intelligence and law enforcement
officials to pose a serious threat of continued acts of violence and terrorism.
It is unlikely that these inmates have a great deal of trust for any government
or prison officials. It seems reasonable that they would be reluctant to speak
open and candidly about any act of violence or terrorism that they committed
in the past, regardless of whether their conversations with their attorneys
were being recorded. 186
In addition, the inmates could be reassured by the fact that, as long as
their attorney-client communications do not fall within the crime-fraud
exception, they will remain privileged. If the privilege team fails to follow
its proper procedures and transfers privileged communications to the
prosecution team, there is legal recourse. If the privileged materials were
intentionally disclosed to the prosecution by the privilege team, and if the
prejudice caused to the inmate was substantial, the court could order a new
trial.187
VII. CONCLUSION
This new regulation was implemented in a response to real and
substantial threats faced by the United States. Its purpose was to prevent a
limited group of people in federal custody from abusing the attorney-client
privilege to cause future acts of violence and terrorism. Any time a privilege
is chipped away, even for just a very select group of people, it can be a
185. Upjohn, 449 U.S. at 389.
186. See, e.g., Noriega, 764 F. Supp. 1480, 1492 (S.D. Fla. 1991) (noting that Manual
Noriega frequently warned the people he was talking on the phone with not to discuss
sensitive matters and repeatedly used coded and cryptic language).
187. See Black v. United States, 385 U.S. 26 (1966).
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dangerous step toward limiting the privilege for everyone. But, the
conditions in this particular case warrant this unprecedented measure. The
regulation is carefully drawn to protect privileged communication that is
monitored and gives redress procedures to inmates who feel that this
measure is unwarranted. In addition, this regulation is extremely limited in
scope. At the moment, only about sixteen prisoners in federal custody
qualify to have their conversations with their attorneys monitored. 1
88
Although some people feel that this regulation is too intrusive and that
the threat of terrorism is overstated, the regulation is necessary. As
mentioned in the introduction, this regulation enabled the Department of
Justice to arrest a lawyer who has been accused of helping her client, the
man responsible for the planning of the World Trade Center bombing in
1993, to pass messages to his followers in order to direct terrorist activities
from his jail cell. 189 In another example, Isabelle Coutant Peyre, the fiancde
and lawyer of the notorious terrorist Carlos "The Jackal", offered to
represent Zacarias Moussaoui, who is under indictment for his role in the
September 11, 2001 destruction of the World Trade Center.' 90  It is
understandable that allowing her to have private conversations with
Moussaoui could possibly impose an unreasonable security risk.
This regulation can be effective, but will it be able to withstand a legal
challenge? It is the opinion of the author that the courts will find that the
regulation does not violate the Constitution. As detailed above, the attorney-
client privilege is not absolute and courts have acknowledged that there are
exceptions to it. An attempt to abuse this privilege to further an act of fraud
or further a crime is not protected. Second, if privileged attorney-client
communications are monitored by the government, but are not used to
prejudice the defendant or to benefit the government, there is no violation of
the privilege. Third, this article has shown that, when the rights of inmates
are weighed against the governmental interest in maintaining peace and
security in the prisons as well as the country at large, the governmental
interest prevails.
Finally, this article recognizes that this regulation could possibly harm
the legal representation of the inmates who are subject to having their
188. DOJ Oversight: Preserving Our Freedoms While Defending Against Terrorism;
Hearing Before Senate Judiciary Committee, 107th Cong. (2001) (statement of Assistant
Attorney General Michael Chertoff), available at http://judiciary.senate.gov/print-testimony.
cfm?id=125&witid=66.
189. See infra part I.
190. Hugh Doughterty, I Enter No Plea Says Defiant Hijack Suspect, BIRMINGHAM
POST, Jan. 3, 2002, at 3, available at 2002 WL 4388879.
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attorney-client communications monitored. This harm, however, is not
irreparable and there are legal recourses available to ensure that privileged
communication stays protected. The courts of this country shape the
contours of a privilege "in the light of reason and experience."' When the
costs imposed on an affected inmate's rights are weighed against the
legitimate governmental interest and benefit in preventing acts of violence
and terrorism, this regulation will likely be deemed reasonable.
191. FED. R. EvID. 501.
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